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PRIVACY: A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE
CONCEPTUAL LANDSCAPE
William A. Parentt
Privacy is a notoriously elusive concept. And the family of con-
cepts to which it belongs is extraordinarily rich in complexity. Sur-
veying this complexity will serve to underscore the philosophical
difficulties that attend serious discussions about the nature and value
of privacy. Giving a rough conceptual overview of the notions com-
monly associated with privacy may enable us to think more clearly
about each one of them and about their relationships with one another.
I also hope that this introduction will help to isolate those concepts
most relevant to the implementation of IVHS.
One of the oldest definitions of "privacy" identifies it with the
condition of being let alone. Warren and Brandeis propose this char-
acterization in their "The Right to Privacy"' and Justice Brandeis'
well-known dissent in Olmstead v. U.S.2 argues that the right to be let
alone is our most valued entitlement. Several other legal scholars ad-
vocate this broad view of privacy. Posner, for instance, claiins that
one sense of privacy is captured by the concept of seclusion and seclu-
sion serves our interest in being left alone.'
Unquestionably, privacy and being let alone are close relatives,
but should they be equated? Suppose that individual B hits A. B has
not let A alone. What do we gain in conceptual clarity, though, by
saying that B has invaded A's privacy? Are there not other concepts
which more perspicaciously describe B's action against A, like assault
and harassment? Of course if B had followed his assault by searching
the dazed A's wallet and finding out that A was in psychotherapy for
depression, then we would have compelling reason to accuse B of an
invasion of privacy.
Another popular conception of privacy identifies it with the con-
trol of information about oneself. Thus, Alan Westin maintains that
privacy is the claim of individuals, groups or institutions tO determine
Copyright 1995 by the author.
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for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others.' And Richard Wasserstrom, in discussing
the Daniel Ellsberg case (where members of the so called "Plumbers'
Squad" broke into the office of former defense department employee
Ellsberg's psychiatrist searching for embarrassing information about
him) writes: "here, it seems to me, the root issue captured by the idea
of privacy is that of control that an individual will be able to maintain
over information about himself or herself."'
But is it just any kind of information about someone whose ac-
quisition diminishes her privacy? Should we say that anytime I walk
or eat in public my privacy is thereby compromised?
To remedy this difficulty some have suggested that privacy be
defined as the control over personal information about ourselves.6
But consider the following case. A person is comatose. His doctor
and family refuse to allow anyone to see him. They do this to safe-
guard his privacy; yet no comatose person can control personal infor-
mation about himself.
Maybe privacy is better conceived as the control over access to
oneself?. On this view, privacy is understood to function like a bound-
ary process whereby people can make themselves accessible to others
or close themselves off.7
But, again, it would seem that individuals in a coma can mean-
ingfully be said to have privacy - when others make them cognitivily
inaccessible to others - even though they themselves lack control over
such access. And there is also the scenario in which A invents a pow-
erful X-ray device that enables her to look through walls. A points
this device towards my home but declines to use it. Since she enjoys
the power to discover virtually everything I am doing in my home it
cannot truly be said that I retain control over personal information
about myself vis-a-vis A with respect to actions done in my home.
Nevertheless A does not actually invade my privacy until she activates
the device.
For those who believe that the concepts of privacy and access are
intimately related, the connection may be thought to be correctly cap-
tured by defining the former as the limitation of access to oneself. I
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believe that this is roughly how Anita Allen conceives of privacy.'
Ruth Gavison endorses it as well,9 as does Jeffrey Reiman in his essay
for this volume.
"Access" is ambiguous. It sometimes means physical contact or
proximity but it is also used to connote the acquisition of knowledge
about a person. The difficulty with definitions of "privacy" in terms
of making physical contact is that we have more accurate terms with
which to describe this behavior, including trespass and the loss of re-
pose. Defenders of privacy as the limitation on cognitive access con-
front the following problem. A taps B's phone and overhears several
of B's conversations thereby uncovering some intimate details about
him. Official constraints, though, have been placed on A's snooping -
e.g. she must get prior authorization from a judge. So there are limits
of A's cognitive access to B. But do we want to say that under these
circumstances B retains his privacy?
In response to the above counter examples I proposed the follow-
ing characterization of privacy. It is the condition of a person's hav-
ing undocumented personal information about herself not known to
others.10 Undocumented information consists of all facts about some-
one that are not part of the public record and as such available for
public inspection. "Personal information" designates facts either that
most people in a given culture choose not to reveal about themselves
(except to close friends, family, counselors, etc.) or about which a
particular person is especially sensitive and which therefore he does
not choose to reveal about himself (except to close friends, family,
etc.).
One difficulty with my account is. its implication that a person's
discovering an obscure fact about my life that is publicly available in,
say, old newspapers does not constitute a loss of privacy for me even
if the discovery is published again and millions of people read about
it.
Two more recent conceptions of privacy merit brief mention. Ju-
lie Inness defines it as the person's having control over their entire
realm of intimate decisions, including decisions about physical access
to oneself, cognitive access to oneself, and intimate behaviors." Inti-
macy in turn, is conceived as a function of motivation from love, lik-
ing, or care.
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But could not a person have this kind of control without having
much privacy because, for instance, her every move at home is being
monitored by the use of powerful snooping technology without her
knowledge? And might not our comatose patient have a good mea-
sure of privacy despite his total lack of autonomy with regard to inti-
mate matters?
Ferdinand Schoeman suggests that privacy be conceived as the
system of norms which facilitate personal expression within domains
ofprivate life. 2 But we have once again to ask whether it isn't possi-
ble for us to have little or no privacy notwithstanding the presence of
such norms. Thus someone might be stealthily observing me expres-
sing myself in bed under a system of laws that encourages such
expression.
Perhaps we should begin to suspect that Schoeman's definition,
like several of the others we have examined, confounds privacy with
the closely related but distinct idea of liberty?
Schoeman's proposal brings to mind one of the conceptions of
privacy that the Supreme Court now embraces. Mr. Justice Stevens
characterizes it as independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.3 In an earlier case Mr. Justice Brennan formulated it thus:
If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individ-
ual, single or married to be free from unwarranted government in-
trusion in the matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.14
But does not the intrusion that concerns the Court in cases involving
the criminal prohibition of contraception and abortion have essentially
to do with liberty or freedom of choice and not privacy?
The second conception of privacy mentioned by Stevens pertains
to the disclosure of personal matters.'5 It is the privacy at stake in
many Fourth Amendment cases. It is also the second of William Pros-
ser's four privacy torts 6 and is certainly one of the values imperiled in
cases like Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp. 17
Prosser maintains that "the law of privacy comprises four distinct
kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff - which
interests have almost nothing in common except that each represents
12. FaEmR~N D. SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AM SOCLAL FREEDOM 19 (1992).
13. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
14. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
15. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606.
16. William L. Prosser, Privacy 48 CAi. L. REv. 383, 392-98 (1960).
17. See 113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). Discussed in Prosser's essay, id., 392-93 and 397.
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an interference with the right of the plaintiff to be let alone."18 In
addition to the disclosure wrong there is intrusion upon the plaintiff's
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. This tort is exempli-
fied by the case of a young man who intruded upon a woman giving
birth. The woman did not know the intruder and was very disturbed
by his uninvited presence.19
But should we describe every instance of this kind as a privacy
invasion? If a soundtrack disturbs my peace or repose do we need
also to condemn it in privacy terms? What do we gain in conceptual
clarity by doing so?
The third of Prosser's torts is publicity that places the plaintiff in
a false light in the public eye.20 Yet privacy, one would think, quite
distinctively concerns certain kinds of facts that are known about a
person. A taxi driver who sues because a: photograph of his face was
published in an article on the cheating propensities of cab drivers2
should articulate his grievance on grounds of libel and defamation, not
privacy.
Prosser's fourth tort is appropriation for the defendant's advan-
tage of the plaintiff's name or likeness.22 However, since this form of
appropriation does not involve finding out personal facts about indi-
viduals mustn't one question whether it has anything to do with pri-
vacy properly conceived? Should not cases like Pollark v.
Photographic Corp., in which a photographer took plaintiff's picture
and put it on sale without her consent, be handled instead under the
right of property? And if the gravamen of petitioner's complaint con-
cerns the perception of her choice, then ought not it be stated in the
language of liberty rather than privacy?
Two additional concepts in the privacy family come from
Supreme Court search and seizure analyses. The first is that of plain
view and it essentially means that "the Fourth Amendment provides
protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents
from plain view and doesn't otherwise unmistakably reveal its con-
tents."23 This doctrine would seem to offer some legal protection to
occupants of automobiles who, for example, have tinted windows.
The second Fourth Amendment privacy concept is that of open
fields. In Mr. Justice Holmes' words: "The special protection ac-
18. Prosser, supra note 16, at 389.
19. Id. The case is DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881).
20. Id. at 398-401.
21. Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F.Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948).
22. Prosser, supra note 16, at 401-07.
23. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982).
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corded -by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects' is not extended to the open fields. The
distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common
law."'24 That individuals may not legitimately demand privacy for ac-
tivities conducted out of doors in places cognitivily accessible to the
public would seem to have direct implications for the implementation
lVHS.
The final concept in the privacy family deserving of brief men-
tion makes a conspicuous appearance in the Warren and Brandeis es-
say. They write: The principle which protects personal writings and
all other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropri-
ation, but against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle
of private property, but that of an inviolate personality."'  Jeffrey
Reiman uses similar language in his more recent defense of privacy:
Privacy is a social ritual by means of which an individual's moral
title to his existence is conferred. Privacy is an essential part of the
complex social practice by means of which the social group recog-
nizes - communicates to the individual - that his existence is his
own. And this is a precondition of personhood.6
So I conclude with two queries: Is privacy indeed necessary to
protect, or even an essential component of, our moral inviolability?;
and does IVHS in any way pose a threat to that privacy and
inviolability?
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